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INTRODUCTION 
Dedicated exploration of the interface between human rights (HRs) and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs or IP) is a venture still in its gestational stage. 
Early outcomes of the conversations seem to agree on a few first impressions. 
First, even though HRs and IPRs developed along different paths, the 
foundation of their underexplored intersection is historically rooted.1  Second, 
the development of both legal domains is influenced by the same historical 
factors; such as the industrial revolution and the expansion of international 
trade, which were catalysts for social, political, and economic transformations.2  
Third, at no time has the empirical importance of the relationship between HRs 
and IPRs been more palpable than the period beginning in the mid-1990s, and 
symbolized by the coming into effect of the Trade-Related Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 
Fourth, as a conjecture, the normative outlook of the relationship between 
HRs and IPRs is clouded by complex paradoxes and are allergic to simple 
resolution.  On the face of it, HRs cater to the optimal realization of human 
potential; while intellectual creativity, which is the concern of IP, is integral to 
realization of human capability and progress.  Fifth, early enthusiasts of this 
important conversation have a historic opportunity to frame and influence the 
understanding of a subject matter that is developing at the pace of its equally 
growing relevance.4  In that expectation, the mapping of indigenous peoples’ 
rights onto the interface between HRs and IP is a critical aspect of the ongoing 
conversation.  However, present attempts to explore the interface of broader 
HRs jurisprudence with its IPRs counterpart reveal apparent conceptual 
obfuscation in regard to how indigenous peoples’ rights are implicated. 
The extent to which indigenous peoples’ rights are integrated into core HRs 
instruments, especially the international bill of rights (IBRs)5 and other 
 
1. See WILLEM GROSHEIDE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 
(Willem Grosheide, ed., 2010) [hereinafter Grosheide Paradox]. 
2. Grosheide argues that both IP and HRs developed in the coincidental contexts of industrial 
revolution in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the resulting expansion in 
international trade by technologically advanced countries. WILLEM GROSHEIDE, General Introduction, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 3, 4–5 (Willem Grosheide, ed., 2010) 
[hereinafter Grosheide Introduction]. 
3. See Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property 
Protection, 5 J. INTELL. ECON. L. 861, 870–71 (2002). 
4. For perspective on the increasing imperative to explore HRs implications of IP, see generally 
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1045 
(2012). 
5. The IBR refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional Protocols made 
under the last two. See generally UNDHR, infra note 30; CESCR, infra note 31; CCPR, infra note 32. 
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international or regional HRs instruments is not apparent; and is at best 
peripheral.  Similarly, the status of indigenous peoples’ rights—as “group” or 
“collective rights”—continues to pose normative challenges to HRs 
jurisprudence, which evolved, in part, as a counterpoise to group tyranny.6  
Perhaps, more important, as an aggregation of rights, indigenous peoples’ rights 
constitute analogous misfits to any specific head of conventional HRs or IPRs.  
Put differently, as opposed to paralleling any specific class of HRs, indigenous 
peoples’ rights are complementary components of virtually every conventional 
HR category;7 the same is true, to some degree, in relation to conventional 
categories of IPRs. 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, especially those relating to their knowledge 
systems; continue to be treated with disdain under the conventional IP system.  
Indigenous peoples’ attitude towards the IP system remains dialectical.  As 
summarized by analysts, “[a]ssertions of rights by indigenous peoples in the 
context of intellectual property encompass two distinct and opposing 
elements—claims to intellectual property protection, and claims to be protected 
from intellectual property laws and institutions.”8  Given the inability of IPRs 
to account for indigenous knowledge, let alone indigenous peoples’ rights, it is 
logical to look to HRs to fill the gaps in IPRs in these areas. 
The evolution and details of indigenous peoples’ rights within HRs theory 
remains a work in progress.  Rather than being a fait accompli, indigenous 
peoples’ rights are part of the inchoate, yet progressive elaboration of 
indigenous issues within HRs jurisprudence.  Even if there is a merit in 
exploring indigenous peoples’ rights from a HRs framework, as a process and 
a state of affair, those rights are sources of irritation on traditional HRs 
jurisprudence.  Substantiating indigenous peoples’ rights within the HRs 
paradigm remains an arduous task. 
Finally, beyond the IBRs, the elements of indigenous peoples’ rights are 
scattered in varying degree of emphasis and details across innumerable 
international legal instruments of varying juridical status.  Within this complex 
and open-ended framework of indigenous peoples’ rights, charting them onto 
conventional HRs categories remains problematic. 
As its primary objective, this article attempts to contribute to an improved 
understanding of the complex nature of indigenous peoples’ rights.  It focuses 
 
6. See Peter Jones, Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 80, 82 
(1999). 
7. There is hardly a specific head of human rights under international human rights instruments 
in which indigenous people’s right as vulnerable groups are not implicated. 
8. See LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 461 (2011). 
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on how the latter are implicated in the contemporary discourse on HRs and 
IPRs, and highlights conceptual and analytical challenges invoked by the 
concept of indigenous peoples’ rights within the HRs-IPRs interface. 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, it is argued, constitute critical components of 
the HRs-IP interface.  There is a need to unveil the conceptual obfuscation of 
indigenous peoples’ rights in the context of contemporary interests in the 
articulation of the nature of the increasingly emergent interaction of HRs with 
IPRs.  Hopefully, such an attempt will illuminate the complexly layered nature 
of this trilogy of rights, and assist all stakeholders to approach these subject 
matters with reflection.  Without this kind of introspection, it is easy to 
perpetuate the historical marginalization of indigenous peoples’ rights.  To do 
so squanders the prospect for a rejuvenation of indigenous peoples’ rights 
discourse now opportune by the current interest in HRs’ relationship with IP. 
Excluding the present introduction and the concluding outline, this article 
is divided into three parts.  Part I explores the evolution and nature of 
indigenous peoples’ rights within the core HRs instruments and highlights the 
extent of their marginalization under that framework.  It also examines recent 
iterations of indigenous peoples’ rights, identifies the pivotal elements of those 
rights and their implication for HRs-IPRs interface.  Part II outlines the tenor 
of the discourse on the convergence of HRs and IPRs, and the peripheral 
treatment of indigenous peoples’ rights in that context.  It highlights fairly 
recent interpretive accommodation of aspects of indigenous rights in tertiary 
HRs instruments.  Part III outlines elements of the peculiar status of indigenous 
peoples’ rights, which constitute conceptual hurdles to framing indigenous 
rights at the intersection of HRs and IPRs. 
I.  INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
FRAMEWORK 
The unhelpful but lingering definitional imbroglio around “indigenous 
peoples” will not detain us at this point.9  Rather, it serves our present purpose 
to focus on the uncontested facts about the status of indigenous peoples.  All 
over the world, indigenous peoples rank at the base of most human 
development indicators.  They “are among the most economically destitute 
members of the human family and have frequently experienced adverse 
treatment, including forced assimilation, destruction of their cultures, racism, 
loss of land and resources to colonizers, governments and commercial 
 
9. See Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative 
and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1999); see also Chidi Oguamanam, Local 
Knowledge as Trapped Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Culture, Power and Politics, 11 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 29, 37 (2008) [hereinafter Oguamanam 2008]. 
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entities.”10  In addition, most indigenous peoples are under continuing threat of 
cultural asphyxiation, necessitating the struggle to realize their right to self-
determination and to negotiate the control of their resources, innovation, and 
knowledge systems.11 
The evolutionary history of indigenous peoples’ rights has been articulated 
elsewhere.12  However, it bears mentioning that the struggle for indigenous 
peoples’ rights dates back to the earliest attempts to understand and resist the 
colonial experience by victims, adversaries, and actors within and outside the 
colonial process.13 
Symbolically, how to deal with indigenous peoples shaped the contestation 
between natural and positivist ideologies that characterize international law 
jurisprudence.  The resurgence of naturalist thinking, beginning in the late 
nineteenth-century, forced a reconsideration of alternative political structures 
to the Westphalia state model favoured by the positivist ideology.  This 
development gave a new understanding to tribal, kinship, and various 
decentralized political configurations through which indigenous peoples related 
to the colonial authorities via various forms of treaties.14  In addition, it paved 
the way for modest accommodation of new actors in the international process 
outside the traditional nation state.15  These new actors are mainly non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, and 
various civil society groups who opposed the degrading and inhuman treatment 
of indigenous peoples. 
The middle of the twentieth-century marked perhaps the most important 
transformation in the development of international law.  Enshrined in the 
United Nations Charter, that transformation is anchored in the recognition of 
 
10. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 432. 
11. See Antony Taubman, Preface: Indigenous Innovation: New Dialogues, New Pathways, in 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT 
(Peter Drahos and Susy Frankel, eds., 2012). 
12. See, e.g., S. JAMES  ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 15-72 (2d ed. 
2004) [hereinafter Anaya 2004].  See generally Wiessner, supra note 9; Russel Lawrence Barsh, 
Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L LAW 369 (1986). 
13. See Anaya 2004, supra note 12; see also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
14. From an Austinian positivist mindset, only nation states were cable of entering into treaties 
with one another; since international law was the law of nations.  As such, there was no legal 
significance to any treaties signed by indigenous peoples (as tribal, ethnic, sub-ethnic or kinship 
entities) with colonial powers.  In essence, the “positivist view denied any legal significance to treaties 
entered into between indigenous peoples and the colonial powers.” See Chidi Oguamanam, Indigenous 
Peoples and International Law: The Making of a Regime, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 348, 357 & n.23 (2004) 
[hereinafter Oguamanam 2004]. 
15. This was championed by the United Nations through the progressive accommodation of 
non-state actors in its processes. 
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“peoples” as the bearers of inalienable HRs.16  Those rights exist as a result of 
the humanity of peoples without regard to the nation state.  The reconfiguration 
was necessitated, in part, by the horrors of Nazi Germany, after which citizens 
were no longer deemed to owe their HRs to the whims and caprice of the nation 
state.17  Rather, the latter had both positive and negative obligations to prevent 
the violation of HRs of peoples. 
The controversy over the appropriate approach to dealing with indigenous 
peoples was instrumental to the evolution of international law, and international 
HRs jurisprudence in particular.18  Ironically, however, international HRs 
instruments shied away from making prescriptions in regard to indigenous 
peoples in any direct sense, at least at the foundational stage under the IBRs.  
Even though HRs were rights that accrued to “all peoples,” the “peopleness” of 
indigenous peoples could not be guaranteed.  Indigenous peoples were for the 
most part targets of selective, rather than automatic, application of HRs.19  In 
the next section, we sketch the gradual integration of indigenous peoples into 
the HRs discourse. 
A.  Beyond Human Rights 
Indigenous peoples make several claims on international and domestic 
processes.  Those claims may be contingent upon the specific historical, 
political, economic, social and cultural experiences of the indigenous peoples 
and the international, regional, or domestic circumstance at any given point in 
time.  Many such claims may not have HRs elements in any direct way.  For 
the most part, however, given that violations or denials of indigenous peoples’ 
HRs are at the core of their experience with colonial powers, HRs have shaped 
and will continue to shape indigenous claims for a number of reasons.20 
The urgency of HRs resonates more with disadvantaged and marginalized 
members of the human family.21  Accordingly, indigenous peoples represent 
 
16. U.N. Charter art I. 
17. See Keith D. Nunes, “We Can Do . . . Better”: Rights of Singular Peoples and the United 
Nations Draft Declaration on the “Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 521, 549 
(1995). 
18. See generally Anaya 2004, supra note 12; S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (2009) [hereinafter Anaya 2009]. 
19. For example, while self-determination was a principal premise for granting independence 
to colonial outposts outside the enclave territories, indigenous peoples of the enclave territories were 
denied the right to political self-determination despite the affirmation of that right in core HRs 
instruments. 
20. See Anaya 2009, supra note 18. 
21. See Comm. On Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. on its 25th, 26th, 
& 27th Sess., Annex XIII, ¶¶ 4, 8, U.N. Doc. E/2002/22, Supp. No. 2 (2002); see also Philippe Cullet, 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property Protection in the TRIPS Era, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 403, 415 n.48 
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the mirror for viewing the progress of HRs.  Similarly, scholars22 agree that 
diverse subjects, including racial discrimination, self-determination, cultural 
and minority rights, labour right, environmental rights and, lately, access to 
knowledge, and resource control implicate aspects of HRs which now 
constitute “the launching pad for an indigenous renaissance in contemporary 
international law.”23 
According to Kingsbury, diverse claims by indigenous peoples may not 
necessarily lend themselves to neat categorization.24  He counsels that as a 
genre, indigenous claims cannot and should not be pigeonholed into one fixed 
exclusive human or non-human rights category.25  Despite, locating indigenous 
peoples claims mainly within the international HRs framework, we must not 
presume that the framework adequately addresses indigenous peoples’ rights.  
As it will become clear shortly, “the peculiar problems facing indigenous 
peoples required more than a shift in emphasis from the general human rights 
framework to a focus on specific indigenous issues.”26 
B.  Three Convenient Frameworks for Indigenous Rights 
For analytical convenience, we identify three convenient frameworks for 
exploring the extent of accommodation of indigenous peoples within the 
international HRs framework.  The first is through the IBRs,27 the principal and 
foundational HRs instruments of the United Nations.  The second is through 
specific treaty instruments with variegated degrees of interest in indigenous 
peoples’ rights.28  The third is through recent soft law and miscellaneous 
instruments that reiterate or synthesize the international consensus on 
indigenous peoples’ rights within and beyond the HRs framework.29 
 
(2007). 
22. See Douglas Sanders, The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Question in International Law, 
1983 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3 (1983); Benedict Kingsbury, Self-Determination and “Indigenous 
Peoples”, 86 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 383 (1992); Raidza Torres, The Rights of Indigenous 
Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 127 (1991); Sigfried Wiessner, 
Joining Control to Authority: The Hardened “Indigenous Norm”, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (2000). 
23. Oguamanam 2004, supra note 14, at 362. 
24. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189 (2001). 
25. Id. at 202. 
26. Oguamanam 2004, supra note 14, at 362 & n.47 (citing Barsh, supra note 12, at 378). 
27. See supra note 5. 
28. Virtually all HRs treaties have some bearing with indigenous peoples to the extent not only 
that the treaties’ subject matters are relevant to specific indigenous issues but, perhaps more important, 
because indigenous peoples are implicated in the treaty subject as the most vulnerable of the human 
society. 
29. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].  See generally Anaya 2004, supra note 
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1.  The International Bill of Rights 
The IBRs refer to the trio of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UNDHR)30 and its subsequent elaboration in two treaty texts, namely the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)31 and the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),32 as well as the associated 
optional protocols.  In terms of history and raison d’être, the IBRs derive from 
the Charter of the United Nations.  There is a degree of harmony in the 
languages of the Charter and the three constitutive documents of the IBRs. 
However, comparatively, the CCPR provisions are specific statements of 
negative obligations for state parties in the areas of civil and political rights of 
citizens.  Concerning those rights, signatory countries are committed to their 
immediate implementation.  There are fewer controversies on the provisions of 
the CCPR among state parties despite the pro Cold-War-style ideological 
tensions that characterized the negotiations of the IBRs. 
In contrast, the CESCR contains a less precise and broader statement of 
amorphous categories of mainly positive and realizable obligations for states in 
the areas of economic, social, and cultural rights.  The CESCR is an instrument 
of pre-eminence in the area of indigenous rights, not necessarily because 
indigenous peoples expectations are less problematic under the CCPR but, 
perhaps, because the density of rights under the CESCR implicate a 
corresponding concentration of indigenous claims.  Moreover, the progressive 
realization principle of CESCR seemed a more pragmatic approach to 
indigenous rights in the context of then unfolding decolonization processes. 
Based on the concept of universality of HRs, the IBRs emphatically extend 
their protective provisions to33: all members of the human family; (all) peoples 
of the United Nations; the human person; all peoples; all/every human being(s); 
all individuals, everyone, etc.  Clearly, from the texts of the IBRs, there is no 
attempt to isolate indigenous peoples outside the general categories of human 
beings as the exclusive targets of HRs.  However, indigenous peoples are 
implicated by inferences through prohibitions against diverse categories of 
discrimination to which they have been historically subjected.  These include 
 
12, at 55–104. 
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) 
(Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UNDHR]. 
31. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), [hereinafter CESCR]. 
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter CCPR]. 
33. The following words and phrases appear in the texts of the constitutive instruments of the 
IBRs. See UNDHR, supra note 30; CESCR, supra note 31; CCPR, supra note 32; and the Optional 
Protocols made under the last two. 
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references to: race, equality, colour, language, religion, social origin, birth, 
slavery and servitude, forced or compulsory labour, torture and other forms of 
inhuman and degrading treatment.34 
The indirect accommodation of indigenous peoples’ rights, albeit in 
negative and non-exclusive terms under the IBRs, has had counterintuitive 
effects. First, subsequent secondary elaborations of relevant provisions of the 
IBRs have been more proactive in not only drawing indigenous peoples’ rights 
into the ambit of IBR provisions, but also in fleshing out the practical 
translations of those rights.  For example, even though Article 27 of the CCPR 
makes no reference to indigenous peoples,35 its reference to minorities has been 
interpreted to include indigenous peoples.36 
Similarly, in their interpretive elaboration of specific provisions of the 
CESCR, through the general comments (GCs), the Committee on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee or CESCR)37 has made direct 
references to various forms of accommodation of indigenous peoples’ rights 
within the ambit of the Covenant.38 
2.  Specific Treaty Instruments 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the institutional source of 
two integral HRs treaties that directly addressed indigenous peoples’ rights.39  
They are the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 1957 (No. 
107)40 and the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169).41  
 
34. See, e.g., UNDHR, supra note 30, arts. 4, 5, 16, 18; CESCR, supra note 31, arts. 2, 7, 10; 
CCPR, supra note 32, arts. 8, 18, 27. 
35. CCPR, supra note 32, art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with 
the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, 
or to use their own language.”). 
36. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of 
Minorities), Apr. 8, 1994, ¶ 3.2, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld
/category,LEGAL,,GENERAL,,453883fc0,0.html. 
37. Part of the responsibility of this Committee of human rights experts is to interpret the 
provision of the CESCR and to monitor and report on its implementations by state parties.  In proving 
guidance to the potential prescriptive details of the CESCR, the committee issues General Comments 
on specific articles of the treaty.  These comments do not have binding force, but they “serve as focal 
points for change in national legal systems and provide a standard against which the Committee can 
review states’ compliance with the Covenant.” See HRs Framework, infra note 80, at 988. 
38. See infra notes 113–121 and accompanying texts. 
39. See Anaya 2009, supra note 18, at 133. 
40. See generally Convention No. 107, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no107/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 15, 2014) 
[hereinafter Convention 107]. 
41. See generally Convention No. 169, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/indigenous/Conventions/no169/lang--en/index.htm (last visited May 15, 2014) 
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Convention 107 “was a first attempt to codify international obligations of States 
in respect [of] indigenous and tribal populations and was the first international 
convention on the subject.”42  The treaty adopted an integrationist approach, 
with the ultimate objective of annihilation of indigenous cultural practices, 
identities and worldviews, to be replaced with those of the dominant western 
colonial powers. 
Subsequent global developments around indigenous policies resulted in the 
rejection of the assimilation model.43  Rather, there was a policy shift toward 
respect for ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism in a manner that raised hope 
for eventual self-determination for indigenous peoples.  This change in tone 
was symbolized by Convention 169’s displacement of Convention 107. 
The transition to Convention No. 169 created a few symbolic impressions.  
First, negotiated on the heels of the IBRs, Convention 107 reflected the 
dominant sentiments in regard to indigenous peoples at the time of the IBR 
negotiations.  Symbolically, as evident in its title, it refers to its subject matter 
as populations as opposed to peoples.  Arguably, construed as populations, 
members of indigenous and tribal communities become equivocal subjects of 
HRs protection in strict construction of the language of the IBRs discussed 
above. 
Convention 107 came at the peak of independence movements of most 
colonized states.  In this charged atmosphere of pro-independence movements, 
it was not only self-serving but also politically prudent to not broach the idea 
of self-determination for the surviving members of pre-colonial civilizations, 
especially in the enclave territories.  There was a fixation on external self-
determination and its unpredictable consequences, notable among which is the 
idea of end-state. 
Third, despite symbolizing a change in the approach to dealing with 
indigenous peoples, Convention 169 is not radical in regard to self-
determination.  In Article 1(3), it declares, “[t]he use of the term peoples in this 
Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the 
rights which may attach to the term under international law.”44  It is remarkable, 
however, that “[w]hile many of the provisions [of Convention 169] are 
consistent with the principle of self-determination the Convention does not 
recognize this right as such.”45 
 
[hereinafter Convention 169]. 
42. See Convention 107, supra note 40. 
43. Anaya 2004, supra note 12, at 58. 
44. Convention 169, supra note 41, art. 1(3). 
45. See What are the Intellectual Property Related Rights of Indigenous Peoples and where are 
they Discussed?, CALL OF THE EARTH LLAMO DE LA TIERRA, http://calloftheearth.wordpress.com/
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As problematic as they are, issues around the two concepts of peoples and 
self-determination need not overshadow the important contributions of the ILO 
on the development of indigenous peoples’ rights.  Without question, 
Convention 107 and its transmutation in Convention 169 are elaborate 
statements of the rights of indigenous peoples.  In a way, they focus on 
indigenous-specific HRs46 on sui generis basis.  Despite their low numbers of 
ratification, the Conventions47 represent the most authoritative, albeit less 
comprehensive,48 binding instrument on indigenous peoples’ rights.  Along 
with the IBRs, they provide part of the foundation for progressive elaboration 
of these rights in subsequent instruments, notably the 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),49 to which we 
shall turn shortly. 
Like the ILO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) also champions the implementation of indigenous 
peoples’ rights through various treaty instruments and development-oriented 
programs.50  Given the symbiotic relationship between education, science, and 
development, UNESCO is an important player in the promotion of HRs.  It is 
a strategic platform for the promotion of indigenous cultural rights (including 
traditional cultural expression, expressions of folklore, intangible cultural 




and-where-are-they-discussed/ [hereinafter Call of the Earth]. 
46. Anaya observes that the declaration elaborates on fundamental HRs “in the specific cultural, 
historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous peoples.” See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra 
note 8, at 442.  See generally REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds., 2011) [hereinafter Allen & 
Xanthaki]. 
47. Upon the coming into effect of Convention No. 169, Convention No. 107 was withdrawn 
for ratification purposes; but it remains in force in 18 countries. On the other hand, only 20 countries 
at the time of writing this article have ratified Convention No. 169.  See generally Convention 169, 
supra note 41; Convention 107, supra note 40. 
48. A few of the gaps in the ILO Conventions include their limited and less direct provisions 
on the rights of indigenous peoples regarding cultural resources.  In addition, the Conventions vest 
much responsibilities on governments toward the realization of indigenous peoples’ aspirations. See 
generally Call of the Earth, supra note 45. 
49. Anaya notes that UNDRIP “is coherent with, and expands upon the provisions of ILO 
Convention No. 169” among other international HRs instruments. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 
8, at 443 (citing 2008 Report on the Situation of HRs and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous at ¶ 
43). 
50. There are seven treaty documents relevant to the subject of indigenous peoples’ rights. See 
infra note 53. 
51. See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO Res. 15, U.N. Doc. 
31 C/Res. 15 (Nov. 2, 2001). The declaration was the precursor to the Convention on the Protection 
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As the “hub for international law and policy on culture,”52 UNESCO 
represents the fusion of culture and knowledge, both of which are at the 
intersection of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination.  The 
organization is associated with seven important treaties53 dealing with different 
aspects of culture in recognition of the pivotal importance of the latter to 
indigenous peoples’ rights. 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a special agency of 
the United Nations, is primarily charged with the promotion of IPRs.  Lately, 
WIPO is attuned to navigate the challenges which indigenous knowledge poses 
for the IP system.  Compared to UNESCO, WIPO’s exposure to indigenous 
peoples’ rights is not a direct factor of its enabling instrument, but an incidence 
of the implementation of its mandate and administration of other treaties with 
indirect impact on indigenous knowledge.  Pursuant to that mandate, WIPO 
views indigenous knowledge from the narrow lens of IPRs as opposed to HRs.  
WIPO is therefore a major platform for the discussion of indigenous knowledge 
issues.  At present, it supervises indigenous knowledge issues through the 
Intergovernmental Committee (IGC) on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional (indigenous) Knowledge and Folklore.  In the course of 
over decade-long deliberations, the IGC is expected to produce comprehensive 
treaties on the protection of various manifestations of traditional knowledge. 
International environmental law instruments in their soft and hard law 
renditions are yet another aggregate platform for promoting indigenous 
peoples’ rights, especially those dealing with biological resources and 
associated indigenous knowledge and environmental stewardship.  A few of the 
instruments include: The Rio Declaration; Agenda 21; the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD);54 the Forest Principles,55 and the Desertification 
 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). 
52. CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE A 
DEVELOPMENT QUESTION 184 (2012) [hereinafter IP in Global Governance]. 
53. They are the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, 2005, Convention on the Safeguarding  of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 2003, Convention 
on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 2001, Convention on the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, Convention on Fighting Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural 
Property, 1970, Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
1954 and the Convention on the Protection of Copyright and Neighboring Rights, 1971. 
54. Including all associated instruments, especially the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Feb. 2, 2011, https://www.cbd.int/abs/ (currently 39 of 50 
signatories needed for entry into force) and its precursor, the 2000 Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Conference of the 
Parties (COP), Decision VI/24 A (2002) [hereinafter “the Bonn Guidelines]. 
55. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles of Global Consensus 
on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc. 
OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:37 PM 
276 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 18:2 
 
Convention.56 
The famous Article 8(j) of the CBD is perhaps the single most important 
provision on indigenous knowledge in a substantive international 
environmental treaty.  That Article has foisted progressive and practical 
strategies for the realization of indigenous peoples’ rights to their knowledge 
through access and benefit sharing (ABS), and the migration of these rights into 
other regimes, notably IPRs and plant genetic resources for food and agriculture 
(PGRFA).  The promotion of farmers’ rights as an integral aspect of indigenous 
knowledge under the PGRFA predates the CBD.57  However, the CBD, 
especially its ABS principles and programs, inspired the principal treaty on 
farmers’ rights; The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture.58  The CBD is the framework instrument for the 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access and Benefit-Sharing,59 which reflects the highpoint of 
Convention’s work on indigenous knowledge. 
Other substantive treaty instruments relevant to aspects of indigenous 
peoples’ rights include: the International Covenant on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination;60 the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women;61 and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.62  Jointly and severally, these instruments focus on discrimination, 
and the vulnerability of women and children.  As the most destitute members 
 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III) (Aug. 14, 1992). 
56. See, e.g., The Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing 
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994, Sen. Treat. Doc. No. 104-
29, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3. 
57. The PGRFA has its roots in the 1983 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture, which resulted from FAO Conference Resolution 8/83.  Food and 
Agricultural Organization, Comm. on Genetic Res. for Food and Agric., International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Res. 8/83, FAO Doc. CPGR/87/Inf.3, (August, 
1983), available at http://www.fao.org/ag//CGRFA/iu.htm. 
58. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, available 
at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf [hereinafter ITPGRFA].  Article 1.1 of the 
ITPGRFA provides: “The objectives of this Treaty are the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out 
of their use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and 
food security.” Id. art 1.1. 
59. See particularly preamblular sections of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/. 
60. Int. Conv. on the Elim. of All Forms of Racial Discrim., 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (1969), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3940.html. 
61. Conv. on the Elim. of All Forms of Discrim. of Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1981), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3970.html. 
62. Conv. On the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (1990), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx. 
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of the human family, these themes resonate strongly with indigenous peoples, 
especially indigenous women and children.  It is instructive that the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child has called attention on the implication of Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on indigenous children in its general comment.63 
3.  Recent Developments – UNDRIP 
Perhaps the most important instrument on indigenous peoples’ rights 
generally, and from HRs perspective, is the 2007 UNDRIP.64  Despite its 
doubtful status as a binding instrument, the document derives its significance 
from a number of factors.  First, it is most unlike any other “declaration” given 
its long evolutionary process and unquestionable legitimacy as evidenced in the 
robust participation of indigenous peoples in its making.65  Second, according 
to James Anaya, the UNDRIP: 
[D]oes not [necessarily] affirm or create special rights separate from the 
fundamental human rights that are deemed of universal application, but 
rather elaborates upon these fundamental rights in the specific cultural, 
historical, social and economic circumstances of indigenous 
peoples . . . [it] reflects the existing international consensus regarding 
the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples . . . .66 
Third, UNDRIP is the most comprehensive elaboration of indigenous 
peoples’ rights in a single document.  Consequently, it helps to capture the 
scope and complexity of those rights at a glance.  Fourth, it represents, in a 
consolidated form, the climax of the attempts hitherto to locate and justify 
peculiarly indigenous peoples’ rights outside the broader conventional HRs 
 
63. See Conv. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 11 (2009), U.N. Doc. No. 
CRC/C/GC/11 (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.GC.
C.11.pdf. 
64. On the significance of UNDRIP, see Allen & Xanthaki, supra note 46; see also James 
Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination in the Post Declaration Era, in 
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 184 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo Stavenhagen, eds., 2009) [hereinafter Anaya 
2009b]. 
65. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE 82 (2006) (arguing 
that “[UNDRIP’s] legitimacy is unimpeachable, given the highly participatory process that led to it”). 
66. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶¶ 40, 43, Human Rights 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by S. James Anaya) (cited in HELFER & AUSTIN, 
supra note 8, at 442 (emphasis added)); see also Anaya 2009b, supra note 64. 
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frameworks.67  Fifth, being essentially a declaration, UNDRIP represents a 
more effective and practical approach to indigenous rights than a new treaty 
could possibly accomplish.  Finally, the declaration represents a bold attempt 
to put to rest the lingering historical controversy over the inchoate status of self-
determination as it applies to indigenous peoples. 
UNDRIP’s exceptional legal and historical status marks it out as a unique 
instrument.  There is no other document more qualified as the starting point for 
distilling pivotal elements of indigenous peoples’ rights, especially those that 
will assist in mapping them onto the intersection between HRs and IPR.  
Without discounting the diverse range of rights under UNDRIP, we can identify 
two of those rights from which all other rights issue.  They are the right to self-
determination,68 and the rights associated with knowledge and culture.  The 
latter are elaborated across the Declaration’s text69 and are associated with its 
provision on IP.70  In a way, the rights to knowledge and culture are extensions 
of the right to self-determination. 
Self-determination is the chart with which to navigate indigenous peoples’ 
rights in their entire detail.  It is “the most central human rights issue for 
indigenous peoples.”71  As an aggregation of indigenous peoples’ rights, self-
determination is one that comfortably situates within economic, social, and 
cultural rights as well as civil and political rights.  It exemplifies the 
indivisibility of HRs. 
The IBRs basically provide the legal foundation of the right to self-
determination.  The CESCR and the CCPR share an exact textual statement of 
the right in their respective first Articles, which states: “All peoples have the 
right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”72  Self-determination is an enabling right, one that capacitates 
the realization of every other promise of HRs.  However, expressed that way, 
self-determination may appear hollow, and runs the risk of representing 
everything, but amounting to nothing.  More meaningfully expressed, the 
 
67. More than elaborating fundamental HRs in the specific cultural, historical, social and 
economic contexts of indigenous peoples, the declaration also articulated specific indigenous claims 
that are not accommodated within the fundamental HRs framework. 
68. See Anaya 2009b, supra note 64. 
69. See, e.g., UNDRIP, supra note 29, art. 5, 8(2), 9, 11–16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31. 
70. See id. art. 31. 
71. HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 447; see also Anaya 2004, supra note 12, at 97 (noting 
that no discussion of indigenous peoples’ rights under international law is complete without a 
discussion of self-determination). 
72. CESCR, supra note 31, art. 1 (emphasis added); CCPR, supra note 32, art. 1 (emphasis 
added). 
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fulcrum of HRs is the dignity and integrity of the human person for the 
realization of their potential, made possible through the exercise of the right to 
self-determination. 
As noted earlier, despite the pre-eminence of self-determination in HRs 
jurisprudence, indigenous peoples have remained equivocal candidates for the 
full realization of the right.  Because of the state-centred nature of the right to 
self-determination, extending the right to indigenous peoples or populations 
remained a matter of jurisprudential hair-splitting for a long time.73  As we have 
noted, the ILO Convention 169 exemplifies the trepidation over extending the 
right to self-determination to indigenous peoples.  Hence, it shrouded the rights 
in caveats.  In contrast to the reluctance of preceding substantive and 
interpretive documents on the issue of self-determination, the UNDRIP lays to 
rest any lingering scepticism over the application of the right to self-
determination to indigenous peoples.  In Article 3, it reiterates exact textual 
provisions of the right to self-determination borrowed from the CESCR and the 
CCPR.74  The difference is that it unequivocally states that “indigenous peoples 
have the right to self-determination.”75 
In its provisions, the right to self-determination is designed to be translated 
into the political, economic, social, and cultural development realms.  As a 
result, virtually all the provisions of CESCR, CCPR, even UNDRIP and other 
HRs instruments are elaborations of the political, economic, social, and cultural 
aspects of self-determination.  Here are two examples: Article 27 of the CCPR 
reads as follows: “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own 
language.”76  Also, Article 20 of UNDRIP provides as follows: “[i]ndigenous 
peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and 
social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means 
of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and 
other economic activities.”77 
IP, and specifically knowledge governance is “directly relevant to self-
determination claims, in particular the cultural and technological, and economic 
development of indigenous peoples.”78  A look at the provisions of UNDRIP 
 
73. See Anaya 2004, supra note 12, at 100–103. 
74. UNDRIP, supra note 29, art. 3. 
75. Id. 
76. CCPR, supra note 32, art. 27. 
77. UNDRIP, supra note 29, art. 20. 
78. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 448. 
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and, indeed, most of the international HRs instruments relevant to indigenous 
peoples’ rights reveal a link between self-determination, and indigenous 
knowledge and cultural practices and, by extension, an exposure of the latter to 
the IP.  In the next part, we synthesize the discourse on the convergence 
between HRs and IPRs, and highlight the peripheral treatment of indigenous 
peoples’ rights in that context. 
II.  HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
According to Helfer, the fairly recent engagement of HRs and IPRs is a 
reactionary consequence of two developments.  The first is the historical 
negligence of the cultural rights of indigenous peoples.79  The second is the 
linking of IP with trade via the TRIPS and TRIPS-plus agreements.80  One can 
add a third reason, namely the continued expansion of both HRs and IPRs in 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, which has resulted in their overlapping 
interest in identical subject matters.81 
On the first point, the 2007 UNDRIP and the 1995 Guidelines for the 
Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples82 resulted from the U.N. HRs 
system’s bid to close the gap that the cultural rights of indigenous peoples posed 
for IPRs.83  In regard to the second and third points, the WTO—through 
TRIPS—now supervises an unprecedented trend of IPRs expansion by 
extending the scope of IPRs coverage to all fields of technology.84  In the same 
 
79. Id. 
80. Laurence R. Helfer, International Rights Approaches to Intellectual Property: Toward a 
Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 982 (2007) 
[hereinafter HRs Framework].  TRIPs-plus refers to regional and various other forms of free trade 
agreements with intellectual property standard that go beyond the TRIPS’ standard. 
81. See Chidi Oguamanam, Intellectual Property: The Promise and Risk of Human Rights, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 319: Interdisciplinary Approaches (B. Courtney 
Doagoo et al., eds., 2013) [hereinafter Oguamanam 2013]. 
82. Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, Comm. On 
Human Rights, Subcomm. On Prev. of Discrm. & Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26 (Jun. 21, 1995) (by Erica-Irene Daes); see HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 
983. 
83. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 982–983. The raison d’être for UNDRIP goes beyond 
IP.  Indeed, the process that eventually resulted in the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples dates back to 1970s, some accounts even trace it to 1960s. It is part of the 
broader struggle for the emancipation of indigenous peoples from colonialism through self-
determination. It received greater impetus in the 1980s when the subjects of indigenous knowledge, 
cultural heritage and intellectual property received more traction in the discourse of indigenous issues. 
For insight, see Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 Eur. J. Int. Law 141 (2011). 
84. TRIPS’ expansion of IPRs is captured under Article 27 which, among other things, provides 
for patent rights on “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”  TRIPS: 
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timeframe, public international law advances interpretative permissiveness of 
economic, social, and cultural rights.85  As well, pressure by IPRs holders on 
both political and economic scenes has resulted in regulatory capture of 
important IPRs norm-creating bodies, including the WTO itself and the 
WIPO.86 
In terms of impacts, TRIPS and TRIPS-plus agreements have been linked 
to setbacks in global progress in HRs.87  Given the ubiquity of IPRs in the global 
social, economic, and cultural fabric, such setbacks pervade all facets of HRs.  
In virtually every traditional HRs realm, notably the rights to health, access to 
essential medicines, rights to food, education, information, freedom of 
expression, and even the emergent right to development, IPRs appear to be on 
trial.  TRIPS is associated with escalating inequities between the global north 
and south.  As well, IPRs are perceived as the tools for freezing access to 
knowledge,88 especially against those in direst need. 
Eschewing elaborations of IPRs’ complicity in fuelling specific HRs 
crises,89 our interest is in the conceptual tenor of those discussions.  In that 
regard, the relationship between HRs and IPRs is expressed from diverse 
perspectives.  The first thinking is that HRs are directly conflicted with IPRs.90  
While HRs are essentially public rights, IPRs are for the most part private 
rights, albeit heavily mediated by pubic regarding considerations.  By their 
 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 21, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 
I.L.M 1197 (1994). 
85. The consequences is that while various forms of innovations in the life sciences (such as 
genes), with ramifications for pharmaceutical, food, agriculture and medicines, are subject of patents, 
on the human rights front, the right to health, access to medicines and the rights to adequate food, as 
well as the right to moral and material interest in intellectual creations are also being fleshed out 
pursuant to the general comments on the CESCR. See generally CESCR, supra note 31. 
86. See SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); see also PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002). 
87. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Current Controversies Surrounding Patent Rights and Public 
Health in a World of International Norms, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 673 (Toshiko Takenaka, ed., 2008) [hereinafter Ho]; INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE SCENARIOS (Tzen Wong & 
Graham Dutfield, eds., 2011). 
88. A caveat is necessary here to indicate that while the undisputed visibility of IP makes it a 
flash point for the escalating HRs gaps in the areas of access to knowledge goods, there are many 
factors that mediate access to knowledge and HRs beyond IPRs.  For instance, while the patent regime 
is complicit in regard to access to life saving medicines by the world’s neediest, factors such as political 
corruption or inadequate infrastructure, to name the few, can also militate against access to essential 
medicines, and other health care deliverables even when patent-related barriers are addressed. 
89. See generally Grosheide Paradox, supra note 1; see also HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8. 
90. Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Co-existence?, 22 
NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 167, 168 (2004) [hereinafter Conflict or Co-existence]. 
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nature, public rights constrain or moderate private rights.  The second is 
premised on the compatibility of the objectives of HRs and IPRs, i.e., the 
advancement of human capacity, welfare, and potential.  In this conceptual 
matrix, HRs and IPRs are mutually re-enforcing and therefore capable of co-
existence.91 
The third is more pragmatic.  It does not see HRs and IPRs as exclusive 
concepts.  Rather, it recognizes that there are HRs and non-HRs aspects of 
IPRs.92  Fourth—and closely related—is that IP can serve as an instrument to 
foster the objectives of HRs.  Fifth, (which is a converse of the third and still in 
the instrumental realm), is that HRs considerations can be a check on unbridled 
IPRs claims.93 
Another tenable view is that IPRs jurisprudence has in-built capacity to 
accommodate variegated HRs-friendly policy-oriented exceptions.94  This is a 
euphemistic way of insisting that IPRs have inherent capacity to resolve the 
ever-permanent question of balance between rights holders and those seeking 
access to intellectual works.95  A well-negotiated balance between HRs and IP 
mitigates the idea of conflict.  Overall, HRs constitute a fairly new and 
important, yet long neglected conceptual platform for negotiating the elusive 
balance in IPRs. 
The HRs regime is the first in time and the most proactive in engaging its 
IPRs counterpart.96  The latter has been historically reluctant to engage HRs.97  
As such, IPRs have yet to demonstrate an understanding of their relationship 
with HRs.  IPRs’ chilling attitude to HRs reflects the gaps in the former’s modus 
 
91. See Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual 
Property?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 268 (2004); see also Grosheide 
Introduction, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
92. Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 710–11 (2007) [hereinafter Ten Questions]. 
93. Groesheide Introduction, supra note 2, at 22–23. 
94. See generally Ysolde Gendreau, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Canada, in 
COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVACY 21 
(Paul L.C. Torremans, ed. 2004). 
95. At national level, the prospects of the legal system negotiating this balance toward positive 
outcome for users of intellectual works is higher in relation to the international level where states’ 
obligations to international agreements are easily undermined by claims to sovereignty.  Also, at 
international level, asymmetrical power relations and negotiating leverage between technological 
strong countries and their less endowed counterparts are more pronounced than the prevailing 
dynamics at national levels.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Do we have a Right to Speak with Another’s 
Language? Eldred and the Duration of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION - INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVACY 109 (Paul L.C. Torremans, ed. 2004). 
96. See Conflict and Co-existence, supra note 90. 
97. There is no reference to HRs in major international intellectual property agreements, 
including the Berne and Paris Conventions as well as the TRIPS Agreement. The converse is true in 
regards to the UNDHR and the CESCR. 
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operandi.  A major challenge in the HRs-IPRs discourse is to fill those gaps so 
that IPRs, in the words of Drahos, can accommodate the “interests and needs 
that it currently does not.”98 
The ongoing rapprochement that the HRs system is making on IPRs is not 
without results.  There are two important illustrations of gestational attempts to 
map HRs framework for IPRs.  One is through the general HRs system of the 
U.N.  The other is through the more focused interpretative process of the 
CESCR.  The first initiative was animated by public health crisis perceived to 
have been aggravated by TRIPS.99  For the most part, the other is both a 
response to the first as well as an incidence of the efforts toward progressive 
realization of economic, social, and cultural rights of the IBRs.  We focus more 
on the economic, social, and cultural rights categories because of their 
implication for indigenous peoples’ rights. 
First, insisting on the primacy of HRs over IP,100 the U.N. HRs system 
capitalized on TRIPS negative outcomes, especially in the area of health in 
developing countries, to stoke tensions between trade-based orientation to IPRs 
and HRs, especially the right to health.  This approach was initiated in 2000 
through Resolution 2000/7 of the Sub-Commission on the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights (the Sub-Commission).101 Titled Intellectual 
Property and Human Rights102 the resolution was, in way, a bold attack on 
TRIPS’ negative effects on aspects of HRs.  That perception quickly spread to 
other key U.N. bodies.103  A combination of events during the early 2000s 
resulted in a perfect alignment of circumstances and opportunities around the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, which marked a period of concerted pressure and 
resistance to TRIPS across regimes.104 
For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) was instrumental to 
 
98. See Grosheide Introduction, supra note 2, at 22 (quoting World Intellectual Property 
Organization [WIPO], The Universality of Intellectual Property: Origins and Developments, at 25, 
WIPO-UNHCHR/IP/PNL/98/1 (Oct. 28, 1998) (by Peter Drahos)). 
99. See IP in Global Governance, supra note 52, at 87–91; see also Ho, supra note 87. 
100. See Intellectual Property Rights and Human rights, U.N. High Comm. for Human Rights, 
Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Res.2000/7, 52nd Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7 
(August 17, 2000) (Adopted without a vote). 
101. Comm. Hum. Rts., 25th Sess., Res. 2000/7, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/subcom.htm (May 
15, 2014). 
102. Intellectual Property Rights and Human rights, U.N. High Comm. for Human Rights, Sub-
Commission on Human Rights, Res.2000/7, 52nd Sess., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.  E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7 (August 
17, 2000) (Adopted without a vote). 
103. See IP in Global Governance, supra note 52, at 87–88. 
104. Resolution 2000/7 articulated the scope of HRs crisis posed by IP in many contexts, 
including technology transfer, right to food, genetic resources, access to patented medicines and the 
exploitation of the indigenous knowledge. 
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the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.105  That declaration forced a hurried but failed attempt to “retouch” 
TRIPS with a compassionate primer in response to a dire humanitarian and 
public health crisis it was perceived to have escalated.  WHO’s efforts were 
complemented by emboldened new actors in global health governance 
committed to addressing pharmaceutical R&D gaps in poor peoples’ disease 
and the problem of patent-driven access freezes to essential medicines at a time 
when the world faced a global health crisis of historic proportion.106  Not only 
did the U.N. HRs system insist upon the primacy of HRs over IP, it committed 
to deepen the understanding of the relationship between HRs and IPRs through, 
among other things, commissioned studies and reports.  Perhaps more 
important, it sought to participate or have observer status in important IPRs 
policy making fora, such as the WTO and the WIPO-IGC.107 
The efforts under the auspices of the U.N. HRs system to promote 
normative primacy of HRs over IPRs lacked legal force for a number of 
reasons.108  First, resolutions of the Sub-Commission are not binding.109  
Second, the Sub-Commission’s claim that TRIPS violates HRs has yet to be 
rigorously scrutinized through the rules of customary international law.110  
Third, along with other initiatives that have promoted the primacy of HRs over 
IPRs, the Sub-Commission’s efforts do not provide textual analysis of HRs 
framework for IPRs.111  In short, claims of HRs supremacy over IPRs appear 
not directly supported by core HRs instruments or principles of customary 
international law.112 
Despite the legal weaknesses of the initiatives of the UN HRs systems, 
 
105. Laurence Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Y. J. INT’L L. 2 (2004). 
106. See Ho, supra note 87; Taiwo A. Oriola, Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy 
Challenges for Managing Neglected Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drugs, 7 CAN. J. L. & 
TECH. 57 (2009); Chidi Oguamanam, Patents and Pharmaceutical R&D: Consolidating Private-
Public Partnership Approach to Global Public Health Crises, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 556 (2010). 
107. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 987. 
108. Id. at 985–986. 
109. Id. at 985. 
110. Id. at 985–86. 
111. Id. 
112. According to Yu, two forms of conflict are activated by IP and HRs.  One is external and 
the other internal.  In regard to external conflict, we need to first distinguish non-human rights aspects 
of IP.  As to internal conflict which exists within the HRs paradigm, he argues, “the principle of human 
rights primacy is inapplicable, because all the conflicting rights have a human rights basis.”  See Ten 
Questions, supra note 92, at 711–12. This Author hesitates to entirely dispense with the human right 
primacy in the context of internal conflict, especially given the interpretative trend of the CESCR. See 
GC 17, infra note 118, ¶ 1.  However, the problem with a primacy approach is that it has to provide a 
response to the concept of indivisibility of HRs. 
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Resolution 2000/7 represents an “ambitious new agenda for reviewing 
intellectual property issues within the U.N. human rights system, an agenda 
animated by the basic principle of human rights primacy.”113  But the rather 
belated task of attempting a textual elaboration of HRs framework for IPRs fell 
on the CESCR via its GCs, which have, essentially, advisory status. 
In 2001, the Committee issued a statement on HRs and IP114 in an attempt 
to “identify some of the key human rights principles deriving from the 
Covenant that are required to be taken into account in the development, 
interpretation and implementation of contemporary intellectual property 
regimes.”115  Though subject to progressive refinement,116 the statement 
provided the foundation for the Committee’s current and long term interest in 
the exploration of IPRs from HRs perspectives.  The Committee identified ten 
cardinal HRs principles pursuant to the Covenant to guide the elaboration of 
IPRs.117  
In accordance with the 2001 statement of principles the Committee issued, 
in 2005, GC No. 17 (Article 15(1)(c)).118  The Article in question deals with 
authors’ right.  It is the key Covenant provision with perhaps the most direct 
relevance to IPRs. It provides as follows: “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone . . . [t]o benefit from the protection 
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author.”119 
Without delving into the elaborate interpretative details of the GC120 on the 
above deceptively simple provision of the Covenant, a highlight of its important 
contributions to the textual elements of Article 15(1)(c) is helpful.  First, the 
GC notes that despite the narrowness of the language of Article 15(1)(c) that 
identifies authors to be natural persons only, “[the authors] could also be groups 
of individuals.”121  Similarly, despite the emphasis of Article 15(1) on 
 
113. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 986. 
114. U.N.  Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Social & Cultural Rights, Substantive 
Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001). 
115. Id. ¶ 2. 
116. Id. 
117. They are universality, indivisibility, interdependence, equality, non-discrimination, 
participation, accountability, general legal obligations, core obligations, international cooperation and 
assistance.  The Statement indicates that these principles are essentially basic and not exhaustive. 
118. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 17 (2005), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter GC 17]; see Hans 
Morten Haugen, General Comment 17 on “Authors’ Rights”, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 53 (2007). 
119. CESCR, supra note 31, art. 15(1)(c). 
120. They are contained in a 17 page document spanning 57 paragraphs. 
121. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 7. 
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individual creators as beneficiaries of moral rights (protection of moral and 
materials interest), “under certain circumstances,” the GC notes, such rights, 
can “also be enjoyed by groups of individuals or by communities.”122  It further 
remarks that even though legal entities are recognized holders of IP, “their 
entitlements [to IPRs], because of their different nature, are not protected at the 
level of human rights.”123 
The GC douses the apparent bias of Article 15(c) for authors as opposed to 
inventors and other categories of innovators outside the authorial realm.124  
Perhaps more important, it breaks the textual silence of the Covenant on 
indigenous peoples.  It clarifies that reference to “scientific, literary or artistic 
production” encompasses “creations of the human mind, that is to ‘scientific 
productions’, such as scientific publication and innovations, including 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities . . . 
performances and oral traditions.”125  The GC notes that the modality to protect 
moral and material interests need not equate with those obtained under 
conventional IPRs so long as such interests can be protected by other means.126 
Referring to “moral interest,” the GC acknowledges that moral rights 
protect the intrinsic personal character of every creation of the human mind as 
an extension of a creator’s personality, toward sustaining “the durable link 
between creators and their creations.”127  Given the recognition of group rights, 
this view fits perfectly within the immemorial link between indigenous peoples 
and their knowledge systems.  On “material interest,” the GC identifies a 
parallel between this right and property rights and the right of workers to 
adequate remuneration pursuant to UNDHR and Article 7(a) of CESCR.  It 
notes that as opposed to other HRs categories, material interests have no link to 
author’s personality but they assist to realize the enjoyment of the right to an 
adequate standard of living.  Shifting the rights from conventional HRs, the GC 
notes that the term of protection of authors’ right on the basis of material 
interest may not be premised on the lifespan of an author.  What is important is 
a remuneration scheme that enables authors to enjoy adequate standard of 
 
122. Id. ¶ 8.  An example of the practical implication of this can be found in the famous 
Australian cases of Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 130 ALR 659 (Austl.) and Yumbulul v 
Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 IPR 481 (Austl.).  Furthermore, Bulun Bulun v R & T Textiles 
Pty. Ltd. (1998) 157 ALR 193 (Austl.), provides a judicial perspective on Aboriginal communal 
interest in copyright, and by extension intellectual property. 
123. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 7. 
124. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Patents and Human Rights: Where is the Paradox?, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 72 (Grosheide ed., 2010) (underlining 
the modest ramification of Article 15(1)(c) for inventors). But see Ten Questions, supra note 92. 
125. GC 17, supra note 118, at ¶ 9 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. ¶ 10. 
127. Id. ¶ 12. 
OGUAMANAM FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2014  1:37 PM 
2014] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 287 
 
living.  While this fits within indigenous peoples’ expectation from the IPRs 
system, unlike the GC’s position on moral rights, it conflicts with the 
immemorial tenor of traditional knowledge. 
In elaborating the principle of general legal obligations of states on HRs, 
the GC reiterates the notion of progressive obligation. It notes that like all other 
HRs, the rights under Article 15(1)(c) impose three levels of obligations on 
state parties, namely to respect, protect and fulfil.128 
Under the consideration of principles of special legal and related 
obligations,129 the GC makes two important observations that have 
ramifications for indigenous peoples’ rights.  They deserve recalling in extenso: 
States parties should adopt measures to ensure the effective protection 
of the interests of indigenous peoples relating to their productions, 
which are often expressions of their cultural heritage and traditional 
knowledge. In adopting measures to protect scientific, literary and 
artistic productions of indigenous peoples, States parties should take 
into account their preferences. Such protection might include the 
adoption of measures to recognize, register and protect the individual 
or collective authorship of indigenous peoples under national 
intellectual property rights regimes and should prevent the unauthorized 
use of scientific, literary and artistic productions of indigenous peoples 
by third parties.  In implementing these protection measures, States 
parties should respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent 
of the indigenous authors concerned and the oral or other customary 
forms of transmission of scientific, literary or artistic production; where 
appropriate, they should provide for the collective administration by 
indigenous peoples of the benefits derived from their productions.130 
The GC recognizes that the provisos of Article 15(1)(c) ought to be viewed 
in relation to other rights recognized under the Covenant.  It insists that for the 
realization of full range of rights, parties must strike “adequate balance” 
between rights under that Article and other Covenant provisions.131  Hence: 
“[i]n striking this balance, the private interests of authors should not be unduly 
favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to their productions 
 
128. Id. ¶ 28. 
129. These are further amplifications of the principles set out under the Statement on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property.  The one refers to obligation that are special to given provision or 
subject matter while the other refers to obligations that have related application to other rights 
recognized under the Covenant. 
130. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 32. 
131. Id. ¶¶ 35, 40(e). 
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should be given due consideration.”132 
Continuing, the GC observes further: 
Ultimately, intellectual property is a social product and has a social 
function.  States parties thus have a duty to prevent unreasonably high 
costs for access to essential medicines, plant seeds or other means of 
food production, or for schoolbooks and learning materials, from 
undermining the rights of large segments of the population to health, 
food and education.  Moreover, States parties should prevent the use of 
scientific and technical progress for purposes contrary to human rights 
and dignity, including the rights to life, health and privacy, e.g. by 
excluding inventions from patentability whenever their 
commercialization would jeopardize the full realization of these rights.  
States parties should, in particular, consider to what extent the patenting 
of the human body and its parts would affect their obligations under the 
Covenant or under other relevant international human rights 
instruments.133 
On a balance, it would seem that the approach adopted by the GC embraces 
both a conflict and a complementary model.  It, however, leaves the impression 
that the prevailing relationship between HRs and IPRs is conflict-driven, 
without disclaiming the potential for HRs complementary framework for IPRs.  
Setting the tone for its approach, the GC points out that Article 15(1)(c) rights, 
like other HRs, are distinct from most legal entitlements incidental to IP and 
should not be equated with them.134  It distinguishes IPRs from HRs as follows: 
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements 
belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of 
individuals and communities.  Human rights are fundamental as they 
are inherent to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property 
rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to provide 
incentives for inventiveness and creativity . . . . [Unlike human rights] 
intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can 
be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.135 
The significance of GC No.17 is not diminished by its status as a non-
binding advisory opinion.  Rather, it is a major attempt under normative 
 
132. Id. ¶ 35 (footnotes omitted). 
133. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
134. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
135. Id. 
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international HRs jurisprudence to explore the HRs-IP intersection, and appears 
to have set the tone on this important subject.  GC No. 17 deals directly with 
just a sub-section of Article 15.136  It is essentially the most preliminary of what 
promises to be a long-term work for the CESCR. 
In addition, by adopting the principles of related obligations, universality, 
indivisibility, and interdependence of HRs,137 the scope of the GC No. 17 is not 
limited to Article 15(1)(c), but includes other aspects of the Covenant.  
Subsequent GC, such as No. 21 (2009) on the rights of everyone to take part in 
cultural life (Article 15(1)(a)) re-echoes the sentiments enunciated under GC 
No. 17.  Unless there is a radical change in orientation of the Committee, its 
future elaborations relevant to HRs and IPRs could be fairly predictable.138 
The belated interest of the Committee on the issues of HRs and IPRs raises 
some concern in terms of cohesion and scope.  Before 2001 when the 
Committee issued the HRs principles for exploring IPRs, it is not clear to what 
extent its previous GCs, for example, GC Nos. 12 and 13—right to adequate 
food (art 11) and right to education (art 13) of 1999—took those principles into 
account.  Undoubtedly, food and education are sites for innovation and 
creativity pursuant to “scientific, literary and artistic production.” 
In contrast, there is remarkable synergy in the language and in the proactive 
engagement with HRs and IPRs in GC Nos. 17 and 21 (right to benefit from 
moral and material interest)—15(1)(c) and (right to take part in cultural life)—
15(1)(a)) respectively.  This is not necessarily because of the location of these 
rights in the same Article text.  Rather, both build upon the 2001 key HRs 
principles for the interpretation of IPRs regimes.139  Notably, there is growing 
recognition of indigenous peoples in the post-2001 GC as a group requiring 
special protection.  Also, remarkable is the increased recognition of the 
collective and communal nature of indigenous peoples’ rights.140 
From the above outlook on the tenor of the HRs interface with IPRs, some 
observations are pertinent.  Indigenous peoples’ rights as HRs are barely 
recognized in the core international HRs instruments, and are not the subject of 
 
136. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 21, Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (Dec. 21, 2009) 
[hereinafter GC 21]. 
137. See supra note 118. 
138. Presently, there is no GC on the right to enjoy the benefit of scientific progress. It is 
expected that any such GC would build on the framework of the post 2001 GCs and would give 
reasonable accommodation to indigenous peoples and their knowledge system. 
139. The general text, scope and interpretive framework of these two documents are influenced 
by the 2001 general principles. 
140. See, e.g., GC 21, supra note 136, ¶¶ 7, 9, 16(e), 36, 37; see also GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 
32. 
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direct references across diverse HRs instruments.141  Indeed, “[w]hen the 
UDHR and the ICESCR were drafted, the drafters did not have indigenous 
groups and traditional communities in mind.”142  Textual accommodation or 
dedicated references to indigenous peoples’ rights appear in secondary 
interpretive HRs instruments, notably the work of the Committee, especially in 
the context of its belated interest in HRs and IPRs.  Even then, the Committee’s 
pre-2001 GCs were not issued with the same level of consciousness over the 
rapprochement between HRs and IPRs. 
On its face, there is a paradoxical undertone in regard to indigenous 
peoples’ rights within the IP-HRs interface.  While indigenous peoples’ rights 
can be potentially impacted in negative ways by the boomerang effect of HRs 
ratchet of IP,143 “the use of human rights regime may even alleviate the existing 
bias against those performing intellectual labour outside the Western model.”144  
And yet, indigenous HRs have yet to be fully integrated onto the normative core 
of international HRs jurisprudence.  The pivotal aspect of indigenous rights, 
namely the right to self-determination remains a right in a state of continuing 
negotiation over the detail of its application to indigenous peoples.  The pre-
eminence of the UNDRIP and its dedication to indigenous-specific HRs issues 
does not necessarily dispense with the need to justify indigenous groups or 
collective rights claims via a vis the individual thrust of HRs.  That then 
provides the starting point in the next section for exploring the difficulties that 
arise in trying to configure indigenous rights at the intersection of HRs and 
IPRs. 
III.  MAPPING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS ONTO HRS-IPRS INTERFACE 
Attempts to locate indigenous rights at the intersection of HRs and IPRs 
readily unveil the root of indigenous peoples disadvantage in both domains.  
This foundational negligence is at the heart of both the desperation to embrace, 
and trepidation to abhor, which depicts the dialectics of indigenous peoples’ 
response to both IPRs and HRs.  Fitting the communal and collective nature of 
indigenous socio-cultural dynamics and their knowledge production processes 
within two individual-centred regimes is an inherently knotty endeavour.  It 
evokes all the tractions of discrimination and exclusion that indigenous peoples 
endure in the colonization project as outliers in western legal traditions. 
Because HRs and IPRs share a unity of focus on the individual, the 
collective character of indigenous rights remains alien to the two legal regimes.  
 
141. This was the situation before the adoption on UNDRIP in 2007. 
142. Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 740. 
143. See Oguamanam 2013, supra note 81. 
144. Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 744. 
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However, the expansive character of HRs supports their extension to groups.145  
Indigenous rights are subtly distinguished as a group right of collective nature 
as opposed to one of corporate nature.  According to Peter Jones, conceived as 
corporate rights, group rights, cannot be represented as HRs.  But conceived as 
collective rights, it is possible to represent such rights “either as human rights 
or as closely akin to human rights.”146  Unlike collective rights, “corporate 
conception accords groups a status that is ultimate rather than derivative” from 
rights of individual members of the collective.147 
Understood as collective rights, indigenous peoples’ rights are immune 
from the traditional objections against group rights in HRs jurisprudence.  
Collective rights do not ascribe a morally distinct or significant identity to a 
group that is separate from its individual members.148  Unlike corporate rights, 
group rights are not a licence to oppress.  They do not subsume the rights of 
their individual members.  They are not necessarily exclusionary in regard to 
other human beings.  Rather, “[a] collective right will be eligible for 
consideration as a human right, or for membership in the same moral family as 
human rights, only if it is a right that we can ascribe universally to human 
beings and that rests upon their moral status as human beings.”149  This nuance 
in the nature of indigenous rights as group rights may have informed the firm 
but controversial preference of indigenous over corporate right holders for 
protection in Article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant pursuant to GC No.17. 
Another challenge that arises in locating indigenous peoples’ rights at the 
intersection of IPRs and HRs is a carryover from the HRs and IP debate.  Just 
as not all IPRs warrant consideration as HRs,150 not all indigenous rights are 
HRs.  The ubiquitous nature of self-determination as an amorphous aggregation 
of indigenous rights runs the potential and real risk of cooptation of all forms 
of indigenous rights, including indigenous knowledge into the HRs rhetoric.  
Along similar lines, referring to the broader HRs jurisprudence, Helfer warns 
that “[w]ithout greater normative clarity, however, such ‘rights talk’ risks 
creating a legal environment in which every claim (and therefore no claim) 
 
145. See id. at 741 (arguing that “human rights instruments contain considerable language that 
allows one to explore collective rights.”). 
146. Jones, supra note 6, at 88; see Geoff Gilbert, Individuals, Collectives and Rights, in 
MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PATRICK THORNBERRY 
148 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds., 2005); see also Douglas Sanders, Collective Rights, 
13 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1991). 
147. Jones, supra note 6, at 92. 
148. Id. at 88. 
149. Id. at 88–89. 
150. Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 727. 
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enjoys the distinctive protections that attach to human rights.”151 
The same temptation is true in regard to the collective nature of indigenous 
rights explored above.  The fact that a right has a collective status does not 
necessarily make it a HR.152  According to Peter Yu, one of the potential 
dangers of HRs rhetoric in the IP arena is corporate hijack of IP protection via 
HRs claims.153  He warns that “[s]uch development would exacerbate the 
already severe imbalance in the existing intellectual property rights system and 
would ultimately backfire on those who seek to use the human rights forum to 
enrich the public domain and to set maximum limits of intellectual property 
protection . . . .”154 
The dangers of HRs rhetoric, especially in regard to indigenous knowledge 
are manifold.  Because of the primacy of HRs, there would be very marginal 
room for regulatory intervention in order to balance real public regarding 
conflicts.155  Such consideration would include access to knowledge, and 
scrutiny of cultural practices that may be in conflict with other HRs.  The 
outcome would be one in which indigenous knowledge is protected beyond the 
dictates of balance, scrutiny156 and critical reflection.157  Also, in a HRs ratchet 
of IPRs, indigenous peoples are in a weaker position to match corporate 
stakeholders in a running contest that has the potential of “a zero-sum game.”158  
In a reference to authors’ rights as HRs (which can be extrapolated to 
indigenous knowledge), Helfer notes that the trend of using HRs to expand 
IPRs has the potential to embolden: 
[I]ndustries and interest groups that rely upon intellectual property for 
their economic well-being [to] invoke the authors’ rights and property 
rights provisions in human rights treaties to further augment existing 
 
151. HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 976. 
152. See JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25 (2nd 
ed. 2003) (noting that “[c]ollectivities of all sorts have many and varied rights. But these are not—
cannot be—human rights, unless we substantially recast the concept”) (quoted in Ten Questions, supra 
note 92, at 730 n.73). 
153. See Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights 
Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1112–13 (2007). 
154. Ten Questions, supra note 92, at 738. 
155. See HRs Framework, supra note 80, at 994. 
156. Id. at 996–97. 
157. Indigenous peoples are not disposed to setting term limit to their knowledge forms which 
is perceived as immemorial, trans-generational and ongoing.  This orientation is in conflict with term 
limit under conventional intellectual property. 
158. See Dreyfuss, supra note 124, at 90 (observing that “by framing the issues as a battle 
among [corporate and indigenous] rights holders, this discourse promotes an adversarial perspective, 
where rights are construed as inuring to one group’s benefit over another’s, and the system as a whole 
is viewed a zero-sum game”). 
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standards of protection. The fear of such expansions helps to explain 
why some commentators are skeptical of attempts to analyze 
intellectual property issues in human rights terms.159 
Not all indigenous claims regarding IPRs or indigenous knowledge are 
necessarily HRs claim.  In locating indigenous knowledge within the 
intersection of HRs and IPRs, it is important to identify the extent or 
circumstance in which indigenous claims may be located on HRs platform and 
when they fit within the instrumentalist economic rights of IP.160  GC No.17 
(Art 15(1)(c) is clear that the scope of the protection of rights recognized therein 
“does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as intellectual property 
rights under national legislation or international agreements.”161  It advises 
against equating IPRs with the HRs recognized under that Article.162 
Some rights, such as authors’ rights may have, on the surface, the attributes 
of both HRs and IPRs.  It is helpful therefore that in addition to identifying the 
attributes of the right in question, a crucial issue is to determine the status of 
rights’ claimants.  When the rights claimants are technically the narrow 
category recognized as indigenous in international law, such claims whether 
presented as indigenous knowledge or IPRs are more likely to have a HRs 
ramification.  This is because given the precarious nature of indigenous 
peoples’ civilizations and the extant threat to their cultural survival, the 
instrumental economic logic comes secondary to the urgency to deploy their 
knowledge and culture to salvage their vanishing identities, individual and 
collective integrity and self-determination.163  On the other hand, other 
categories of rights claimants who are technically not indigenous and who are 
not faced with dire HRs crisis and threats to cultural survival are more likely to 
stake their claims to knowledge on the instrumental economic logic of IPRs.164 
The last major issue that saddle indigenous peoples right at the intersection 
of HRs and IP arises from the dialectic of HRs and IPRs, which has a spillover 
effect on indigenous rights.  On their merits, without reference to indigenous 
peoples’ rights, HRs and IP have a mutually re-enforcing and yet paradoxical 
relationship.  The one is capable of undermining and re-enforcing the other. 
 
159. HRs Framework, supra 80, at 1015. 
160. See HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 475. 
161. GC 17, supra note 118, ¶ 2. 
162. Id. ¶ 3. 
163. Chidi Oguamanam, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge in International Law: Solidarity 
Beyond the Nation-State, 8 L. TEXT CULTURE 191, 213-14 (2004); Oguamanam 2008, supra note 9, at 
39–40. 
164. Right claimants in this category are mostly local communities in the non-enclave 
territories of the present day global south. 
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While HRs framework is capable of bolstering indigenous rights, especially 
indigenous knowledge, the latter is unlikely to fare better under HRs ratchet.  
Not many would disagree that those claims are still at the periphery of HRs, 
and recent attempts in HRs jurisprudence to accommodate indigenous 
knowledge are at their very early stage.165  Inevitably, they are being elaborated 
on ad hoc basis.  As such, they are hardly capable of bridging the dichotomous 
theoretical and philosophical foundations of indigenous peoples’ rights and 
HRs. 
On IPRs, indigenous rights claimants are fully conscious of IPRs’ double-
edged nature, especially in the context of indigenous knowledge.  IP has the 
ability to serve the ends of economic empowerment for indigenous knowledge 
holders.  Yet, it potentially represents a threat to cultural survival because of its 
reductionist inclination to weigh creativity and cultural production on narrow 
scale of economic or market values.166  Not to mention its overall disdain for 
indigenous knowledge as unowned knowledge, devoid of intellectual ingenuity.  
In a critical appraisal of the dialectical relationship between IP and indigenous 
knowledge, it has been observed that “[i]ndigenous and local communities . . . 
have a complex relationship with the intellectual property system.  From 
suspicion and trepidation, they engage that system reluctantly, but often 
proactively . . . .  [and] [l]ike the ‘dialectics of the colonized mind,’ indigenous 
peoples’ attitude toward intellectual property reflects both admiration, and 
disaffection or resistance.”167 
For example, indigenous peoples oppose IP expansion in the realm of health 
and essential medicines, and in the appropriation of intangible cultural 
knowledge and expression of folklore.  On the other hand, they are not averse 
to the use of IP to protect their knowledge systems, especially in the realm of 
biodiversity or bio-cultural knowledge, including farmers’ rights and place-
based innovation or forms of geographical indications.168 
This complex dialectical approach to IP by indigenous rights holders is 
even affirmed in the two important documents on indigenous rights, the 
UNDRIP and the Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage 
of Indigenous Peoples.169  While these documents encourage traditional 
 
165. See generally, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT (Peter Drahos and Susy Frankle, eds., 2012). 
166. See Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual 
Property the Answer?, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
167. See Chidi Oguamanam, Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative 
Legal Intervention, and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
489, 490 (2008). 
168. See Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 297–98 (2006). 
169. Special Rapporteur on the Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Protection of the 
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knowledge within existing IPRs paradigms, their approach to protectable 
subject matters transcend the IP system.170  Along these line, Helfer notes that 
“a human rights-inspired analysis of traditional knowledge views intellectual 
property as one of the problems facing indigenous communities, and only 
perhaps, as part of the solution to those problems.”171 
CONCLUSION 
Extant exploration of the interface between HRs and IP focuses on 
conventional HRs categories.  The extent to which these categories include 
indigenous peoples’ rights remains inchoate.  Unexpectedly, the historical and 
jurisprudential orientation of both HRs and IPRs on individual as opposed to 
group rights does not dispose them to engage fully with indigenous peoples’ 
rights, including their knowledge systems.  Consequently, HRs-IPRs interface 
inevitably exposes the roots of the historical challenge, which the indigenous 
question poses for the colonial western legal tradition. 
Yet, HRs-IP interface presents a unique opportunity for revisiting the gaps 
in both HRs and IP jurisprudence on account of indigenous peoples’ rights.  In 
a counterintuitive way, as both a negotiating process and its outcome HRs 
encounter with IP can be measured meaningfully by focusing on its 
ramification for indigenous peoples as the most vulnerable members of the 
human family.  After all, “the realization of human rights must be judged 
according to the level of implementation among the most disadvantaged.”172  A 
critical understanding in both historical and contemporary contexts of the 
nature and evolution of the rights of indigenous peoples is necessary.  In the 
least, such understanding is a foundational matter to make the case that no 
meaningful discourse of HRs-IP interface is possible without engaging the 
rights of indigenous peoples. 
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